



United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Office of Inspector General

OCT 26 2012

Dear Chairman Lieberman:

As promised in our initial response to your letter dated September 14, 2012, in which you asked our Office of Inspector General to review the Department's development of security requirements in light of the attacks in Benghazi and other incidents at US diplomatic facilities, our Offices of Audits and Inspections have prepared "scopes of work" and proposals to address these issues and embassy security worldwide.

Office of Audits

Our Office of Audits (AUD) is in the process of preparing two new scopes of work for audits that will commence in January 2013. Specifically, AUD plans to review the Department of State's (Department) efforts to analyze, disseminate, and utilize threat intelligence to improve the security posture of overseas posts that have high threat levels for political violence and terrorism. In addition, AUD plans to review the process used by contractors to evaluate the suitability of local guards employed to protect our overseas posts.

AUD is currently engaged in an extensive effort to evaluate whether selected embassies that have high threat levels are complying with physical security standards. This effort has been separated into two audits. The first audit, which encompassed posts located in Europe, South America, and Africa is being finalized and the draft report is being prepared. The second audit, which was announced earlier this month in light of the recent threats and attacks on our posts in Africa, includes the same objectives as the first audit, but focuses on selected posts within the Bureau of African Affairs.

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman,

Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs,
United States Senate.

AUD also recently issued two audit reports that are relevant to post security protocols. In AUD's February 2012 *Review of Best-Value Contracting for the Department of State Local Guard Program and the Utility of Expanding the Policy Beyond High-Threat Posts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan*, the auditors found that at some overseas posts local guard contracts awarded under the lowest-price award method had contractor performance problems. In AUD's September 2012 *Evaluation of the Local Guard Force Contract for Embassy Islamabad and Consulates General Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar*, delivered to your committee on October 12, 2012, the auditors found that the local guard force was not being trained in accordance with contract requirements.

Office of Inspections

The scope of work for our Office of Inspection (ISP) in the year ahead includes plans to inspect the Bureau of Intelligence and Research this winter and will be attentive to how credible threat information is coordinated within the Department and expeditiously shared with overseas diplomatic missions. Inspectors will monitor the implementation of any recommendations from the Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) report and will review them as future inspections are conducted.

ISP is planning an inspection of Embassy Baghdad and constituent posts, with a focus on protective operations absent the U.S. military and related equipment, especially at the consulates. Inspections are also being considered for Embassies Beirut and Rabat.

At present we are inspecting a number of missions, including Nigeria and the Philippines, and will assess security measures as part of those inspections. I have approved an expanded scope of work that directs inspectors to assess how well threat information is used to decide travel policy and opening and closing of diplomatic facilities (as per tripwires); examine any request for additional security resources and the Department's response; assess post management's degree of confidence in host-nation security support; and evaluate the efficacy of emergency drills, in particular for a terrorist attack with gunfire inside the compound.

As part of its regular inspection protocol, ISP reviews security practices and procedures at overseas posts. During inspections at 105 diplomatic missions over the past five years, security inspectors made more than 900 recommendations, most of which the Department has complied. Nearly all the security recommendations are reported in classified annexes to inspection reports, all of which have been delivered to your Committee.

In March 2009, ISP issued a report, "Review of the Department's Implementation of Mantraps" (sensitive, but unclassified) recommending that the Department provide guidance to posts regarding the requirement and installation procedures for mantraps. This was an issue highlighted by the ARB convened in the aftermath of the 2004 attack on Consulate General Jeddah. In addition, ISP has been examining the need for emergency sanctuaries or safe places of refuge for employees, another issue featured in the Jeddah ARB report and now made even more critical by the tragedy in Benghazi.

Addressing another area of concern, ISP is preparing a report that reviews the process whereby embassies are granted exceptions and waivers to security standards that are difficult to comply with immediately. Inspectors noted conditions of non-compliance with physical security standards for office space that were never reported to the Department until the inspection was conducted. The report will include recommendations to strengthen that process.

ISP's current work also includes a report that will recommend that the Foreign Service Institute develop a block of instruction for the Deputy Chief of Mission and Principal Officer courses which describes the program responsibilities of regional security officers, as well as measures to evaluate their performance.

ISP has long focused on a range of security issues in the course of inspecting embassies and their constituent posts. Regarding detection, we issued recommendations on the addition and maintenance of closed-circuit television cameras to monitor the perimeter and vehicle entrances to embassies and consulates, and for equipment to detect explosives, weapons and substances that could put embassy staff at risk.

OIG recommendations related to deterrence addressed anti-ram vehicle barriers and anti-climb walls and fencing, forced-entry and ballistic resistant doors and windows, additional perimeter and compound lighting and strengthening existing doors with stronger locks and installing additional perimeter and compound lighting. Additional deterrence recommendations related to armored vehicles, local guards, pedestrian and vehicular traffic control procedures, mantraps and sally ports, Marine security guards, shatter resistant window film and security grilles on windows.

Recommendations related to responding to attacks and other emergencies included the need to properly equip alternate command centers and to use them in crisis management exercises. We recommended conducting weekly emergency and evacuation radio checks and mandated emergency drills. We also emphasized the need for maintaining updated emergency action plans, installing secondary means of egress from safe havens; and providing surveillance detection teams with the ability to remotely activate imminent danger notification systems in response to an actual or potential attack.

In 2012, we inspected the [Office of Antiterrorism Assistance \(ATA\)](#) and the [Bureau of Counterterrorism \(CT\)](#), and recommended that CT improve management of foreign assistance programs; enhance cooperation with ATA in managing the global ATA program; and take direct control of the funding for its Regional Strategic Initiative.

In a 2011 [compliance follow up review of our inspection of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations \(OBO\)](#), we noted that the Department addressed shortcomings in fire inspections at overseas posts by placing responsibility on post management officers to certify that post conducted a fire and life safety inspection even though OBO did not conduct the required annual inspection. We also emphasized that technical and operational fire protection issues must be reported.

We had a productive meeting with several members of your committee staff on October 18, 2012, and thoroughly reviewed our proposed scope of work, detailed above.

Please do not hesitate to contact me or Erich Hart, our General Counsel, if you have any further questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

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Harold W. Geisel
Deputy Inspector General

Cc: The Honorable Susan M. Collins, Ranking Member



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